We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium, and dominance, under uncertainty. We provide scenarios wherein the profile of true preferences is the same but the equilibrium profiles are different, because the voters have different knowledge about other voters. We also model actions that change such uncertainty about preferences, such as a voter revealing her preference. We show that some forms of manipulation and equilibrium are preserved under such uncertainty updates and others not. We then formalize epistemic voting terminology in a logic. Our aim is to provide the epistemic background for the analysis and design of voting rules that incorporate uncertainty.
Introduction
A well-known fact in social choice theory is that strategic voting, also known as manipulation, becomes harder when voters know less about the preferences of other voters. Standard approaches to manipulation in social choice theory (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) as well as in computational social choice (Bartholdi et al., 1989) assume that the manipulating voter knows the sincere preferences of other voters. Some approaches (Duggan and Schwartz, 2000; Barberà et al., 1998) assume that voters have a probabilistic prior belief on the outcome of the vote, which encompasses the case where each voter has a probability distribution over the set of profiles. In yet other approaches the uncertainty of the manipulator is modelled as the inability to distinguish between a set of voting profiles (Conitzer et al., 2011; Meir, 2015) . In Conitzer et al. (2011) manipulators have incomplete knowledge of the non-manipulators' preferences. Meir (2015) is a setting for iterated voting, wherein incomplete knowledge of the profile at the next iteration is induced by the partial view on the profile at the current iteration. Still, we think that the study of strategic voting under complex belief states has received little attention so far, especially when voters are uncertain about the uncertainties of other voters, i.e., when we model higher-order beliefs of voters.
In this contribution we present a logic to model higher-order uncertainty of voters. On the assumption that voters may be uncertain about other voters' preferences but know their own preference, we model how this uncertainty may determine a strategic vote, and how a reduction in this uncertainty may change a strategic vote. We give scenarios where the profile is the same, and even the set of profiles about which the manipulator is uncertain is the same, but where the uncertainty about other voters is different, thus resulting in different manipulations. Additionally, reducing such uncertainty may affect manipulative behaviour, and we also give example scenarios for that. We model uncertainty reducing actions as truthful public announcements (Plaza, 1989) .
There are several ways of expressing incomplete knowledge about the linear order of preference of a voter. The literature on possible and necessary winners assumes that it is expressed by a collection of partial strict orders (one for each voter), while Hazon et al. (2008) consider it to consist of a collection of probability distributions, or a collection of sets of linear orders (one for each voter), i.e., a collection of profiles. For partial preference see also Konczak and Lang (2005) and more generally for voting under incomplete knowledge see Boutilier and Rosenschein (2016) .
A link between epistemic logic and voting has been given in Chopra et al. (2004) they use knowledge graphs to indicate that a voter is uncertain about the preferences of another voter. A more recent follow-up, within the area known as social software, is Parikh et al. (2013) . Conitzer et al. (2011) and Meir (2015) walk a middle way: uncertainty of a manipulating voter is modelled in information sets, but other voters are not uncertain. Our setting shares also some similarity with robust mechanism design (Bergemann and Morris, 2005) , which generalizes classical mechanism design by weakening the common knowledge assumptions of the environment among the players and the planner. In Bergemann and Morris (2005) uncertainty is modelled with information partitions. The main technical difference is that in our setting, as in classical social choice theory, preferences are ordinal, whereas in (robust) mechanism design preferences are numerical payoffs, which allows for payments.
Modal logics of social choice and of voting have been proposed in Troquard et al. (2011) and, building on that, in Ciná and Endriss (2016) ; Perkov (2016) . In these logics the semantic primitives are also preferences of agents or voters, and sets of those, i.e., profiles. But the modalities encode agency, and not uncertainty, as we do. Compared to their results the logical equivalents of our voting primitives are very 'flat': essentially we encode them as big disjunctions of profiles, for example, we represent the proposition that a is the winner of the election by the (very large) disjunction of all profiles wherein this is the case, given that the voting function F is a parameter of the logic (and not of the model, as in Ciná and Endriss (2016) ). In our case, all the logical action goes into the uncertainty about profiles, and the modelling results involve the formalization of epistemic notions such as conditional (i.e., Bayesian) equilibrium, and their (epistemic) updates. This is an overview of our contribution. Section 2 presents voting terminology. Section 3 introduces knowledge profiles, our semantic primitive. Section 4 investigates epistemic notions of dominance. Section 5 defines equilibrium profiles under uncertainty, wherein voting is represented as a Bayesian game. Section 6 is devoted to uncertainty updates and how this affects knowledge of other voters and equilibrium profiles. Then, in Section 7 we succinctly present the logic of this contribution more formally -we do this at the end, because our main focus is the semantic interaction of knowledge and voting, not the logic. A short conclusion (Section 8) is followed by a long Appendix (page 19) with detailed computations of conditional equilibrium profiles in a toy example.
Voting
Assume a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of n voters (or agents), and a finite set C = {a, b, c, . . . } of m candidates (or alternatives). Voter variables are i, j, . . . , and candidate variables are x, y, (x 1 , x 2 , ).... Let O(C) be the set of linear orders on C.
Definition 1 (Preference, profile, voting rule, vote) For each voter i, a preference (relation) (over C) is a linear order on C. A profile ≻ is a function ≻: N → O(C) assigning a preference ≻(i), denoted as ≻ i , to each voter. A (resolute) voting rule is a function F : O(C) N → C from the set of profiles for N to the set of candidates. From the perspective of the voting rule the enacted preference ≻ i is a vote.
The voting rule determines which candidate wins the election -F (≻) is the winner. In case there is more than one tied co-winner we assume a tie-breaking preference, that is a linear order over candidates. In the plurality voting rule the winner is the candidate who is most often ranked the top candidate (most preferred in ≻ i ), where in case there are several co-winners the tie-breaking preference selects one.
Voters cannot be assumed to vote according to their preference. Instead of giving her sincere or truthful preference, a voter may cast another preference as her vote. This is an insincere or strategic preference. If that vote improves the outcome it is a manipulation.
The combination of a profile ≻ and a voting rule F defines a strategic game: a player is a voter, an individual strategy for a player is a preference, a strategy profile (of players) is therefore a profile in our defined sense (of voters), and the preference of a player among the outcomes is according to her sincere vote: given profiles ≻ ′ , ≻ ′′ , voter i also prefers outcome F (≻ ′ ) over outcome F (≻ ′′ ) in the game theoretical sense iff (in the voting sense) F (≻ ′ ) ≻ i F (≻ ′′ ). The relevant notions of dominance and equilibrium are as follows.
A dominant preference corresponds to a dominant strategy in game theory. 1 The reader will recognize this as weak dominance. We may also use strong dominance, which holds for
Note that a dominant preference need not be a manipulation of ≻: the strict part may be satisfied for another profile than the profile ≻ of true preferences. (Of course, a strongly dominant strategy is also a manipulation.)
Definition 4 (Equilibrium profile) A profile ≻ is an equilibrium profile iff no voter has a manipulation of ≻.
An equilibrium profile corresponds to a Nash equilibrium (in game theory). An equivalent way of defining equilibrium profile is: A profile ≻ is an equilibrium profile iff for all
. The formulations correspond: Suppose the above condition does not hold. Then there is a voter i and some pref-
In other words, if the condition holds, then no voter has a manipulation of ≻.
Knowledge profiles
We model uncertainty in voting as incomplete knowledge about the profile. The structures to represent such uncertainty are standard in modal logic (Fagin et al., 1995; van Ditmarsch et al., 2008) . To allow for the definition of dominance and of equilibria under uncertainty, we require that voters know their own preference.
Definition 5 (Knowledge profile) A profile model is a structure M = (S, ∼, π), where S is a domain of abstract objects called states; where ∼ : N → P(S × S) is a function such that for i = 1, . . . , n, (∼(i) written as) ∼ i is an indistinguishability relation that is an equivalence relation; and where valuation π : S → O(C) N assigns a profile to each state and such that s ∼ i t implies π(s) i = π(t) i . The information set of voter i in state s is defined as
Unless confusion results, the set π([s] ∼ i ) of profiles that i considers possible is also called an information set, as in the voting literature (Conitzer et al., 2011) . In general, different information sets (i.e., sets of states) may be about the same set of profiles.
Definition 6 (Knowledge and ignorance) Given is a knowledge profile M s , where M = (S, ∼, π). Let ϕ be a proposition about profiles. Voter i knows ϕ in M s , iff ϕ is true in all t ∈ S such that s ∼ i t. Voter i considers possible that (or does not know that not) ϕ in M s , iff ϕ is true in some t ∈ S such that s ∼ i t; if, in that case, there is an additional state u ∈ S with s ∼ i u in which ϕ is false, then we say that i does not know whether (or is uncertain about, or is ignorant about) ϕ.
Section 7 contains a proper inductive definition of 'proposition about profiles', and a formal semantics. For now it suffices to say that the following are propositions about profiles: ≻ or 'the profile is ≻'; a ≻ i b, and ≻ i ('the preference of voter i is ≻ i '); and also propositions like 'voter i knows that voter j knows ≻ i '. Example 7 demonstrates that: different states may be assigned the same profile, but have different knowledge properties. In scenarios where different states are always assigned different profiles, we can say that the uncertainty of a voter is (only) about a collection of profiles. But in scenarios where different states are assigned the same profile, the set π([s] ∼ i ) of profiles that voter i considers possible is smaller than the set [s] ∼ i of states that i considers possible.
Partial preferences cannot be expressed in our framework. In particular, uncertainty between a ≻ i b ≻ i c and b ≻ i a ≻ i c does not mean indifference between candidates a and b. Uncertainty between a
, which is equivalent to (not (b i a and a i b)). That is the opposite of indifference between a and b, as that means (b i a and a i b).
Example 7 Consider two voters who are Leela (1) and Sunil (2), children of Devi, and who 'vote' for an animated movie to see before bedtime; where the choice is between a (Alice in Wonderland), b (Brave), and c (Cars). Leela's preference is a ≻ 1 b ≻ 1 c and Sunil's preference is c ≻ 2 b ≻ 2 a. Sunil (2) is uncertain if Alice is Leela's most or least preferred movie, and dually if Cars is Leela's least or most preferred movie. Leela's (1) uncertainty is of the more interesting kind: she knows Sunil's preference, but she is uncertain whether Sunil knows her preference.
We model this as a knowledge profile M t consisting of three states s, t, u and for two voters 1 and 2. State s is assigned to profile ≻, wherein a ≻ 1 b ≻ 1 c and c ≻ 2 b ≻ 2 a, etc. Below, a column represents a preference relation, and states that are indistinguishable for a voter i are linked with an i-labelled edge. The partition for 1 on the domain is therefore {{s, t}, {u}}, and the partition for 2 on the domain is {{s}, {t, u}}.
States s and t have been assigned the same profile ≻ but have different epistemic properties. In s, 2 knows that 1 prefers a over c, whereas in t, 2 does not know that. We list some relevant propositions that are true in the actual state t:
• Leela prefers Alice over Cars. This is true, because a ≻ 1 c in t.
• Sunil does not know that Leela prefers Alice over Cars. This is true, because t ∼ 2 u, and a ≻ 1 c is false in u.
• Leela knows Sunil's preference, but she is uncertain whether Sunil knows her preference. In s, Sunil knows that Leela's preference is a
Unlike merely sincere and insincere preference, in knowledge profiles there are three kinds of preference: actual sincere preference, possible sincere preference, and insincere preference. In M t of Example 7, Leela's actual sincere preference is a ≻ 1 b ≻ 1 c, a possible sincere preference is c ≻ 1 b ≻ 1 a (namely in state u, from the perspective of Sunil), and an insincere preference is b ≻ 1 a ≻ 1 c. This can be confusing.
Manipulation, knowledge and dominance 4.1 Manipulation and knowledge
Given are a knowledge profile M s where π(s) = ≻, and a voting rule F . If voter i can manipulate ≻, then voter i can also manipulate M s . This is because manipulation is defined with respect to the profile of the actual state of the knowledge profile (it is a game theoretical notion, not an epistemic notion). So it may be that a voter can manipulate the vote but does not know that, because she considers another profile possible wherein she cannot manipulate the vote. Notions of manipulation that involve knowledge can be borrowed from the knowledge and action literature (van Benthem, 2001; Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004) . A curious situation is when in all states that the voter considers possible there is a manipulation, but where, unfortunately, this may be a different manipulation in different states. So she knows that she has a manipulation, but she does not know what the manipulation is. This is called de dicto knowledge of manipulation. A stronger form of knowledge is when there is a preference ≻ ′ i that is the same manipulation in any state that the voter considers possible. This is called de re knowledge of manipulation.
Definition 8 (Knowledge of manipulation) Given are a knowledge profile M s and a voting rule F .
If voter i knows de re that she can manipulate the election, she has the ability to manipulate, namely by strategically voting ≻ ′ i . But in de dicto manipulations the voter does not seem to have that ability. It is akin to 'game of chicken' type equilibria in game theory, wherein for each strategy of a player there is a complementary strategy of the other player such that the pair is an equilibrium, but where this choice cannot be made without coordination. An example of de dicto knowledge of manipulation for Borda voting is given in van Ditmarsch et al. (2013) .
Consider the profile model H consisting of the domain O(C) N , so we can identify states s with their profiles ≻ = π(s), and such that all voters only know their own preferences:
In this (unique) model it is common knowledge that voters only know their own preferences. We can see it as an interpreted system (Fagin et al., 1995) consisting of global states that are profiles and where local states are individual preferences. A model such as H is known as a hypercube (Lomuscio, 1999) .
Proposition 9
In the hypercube profile model, knowledge of manipulation is impossible for plurality voting.
Proof The result holds for de re knowledge of manipulation and for de dicto knowledge of manipulation. We start with the de re case.
Let ≻ be the profile. Let us assume that there are a sufficient number of voters and candidates to avoid boundary cases. Assume towards a contradiction that voter i knows that ≻ ′ i is a manipulation. As i is uncertain about the preferences of other voters, she considers it possible all other voters j have the same preferences as herself, i.e., she considers it possible that the profile is ≻ ′′ ∈ O(C) N such that for all j ∈ N , ≻ ′′ j = ≻ i . In that case, i's preferred candidate would have won by majority vote, contradicting the assumption that ≻ ′ i is a manipulation. In the de dicto case, for each profile that voter i considers possible there is a manipulation. For all those profiles, assuming that all other voters j have the same preference as i, again derives a contradiction.
Dominant manipulation and knowledge
We now compare the notions of manipulation and dominant strategy with the notion of dominant manipulation of an information set in voting theory (Conitzer et al., 2011) .
Definition 10 (Dominant manipulation of an information set) Let a knowledge profile M s with π(s) = ≻, i ∈ N , ≻ ′ i ∈ O(C), and a voting rule F be given. If for all
Observe that dominant manipulation of an information set according to Conitzer et al. (2011) is on the assumption that all other voters vote according to their true preference, whereas dominant preference in the game theoretical sense (Def. 3) is on the assumption that all other voters can choose any preference as their vote. The first is dominance no matter the true preference of others, the second is dominance no matter the vote of others, whether this is their true preference or not. Proof 1. The strictness requirement of dominance must apply to ≻.
2. See the curious observation above.
3. The notion is defined with respect to an information set.
4. The strictness requirement of dominant manipulation might apply to another than the actual profile.
5. The strictness requirement of dominant manipulation need not apply to all profiles in the information set, as in knowledge of manipulation (both de re and de dicto).
6. Strictness holds for all profiles in the information set, and therefore for some.
Given Proposition 11.2, Proposition 9 stating that knowledge of manipulation is impossible in the hypercube, for majority voting, should therefore be credited to Conitzer et al. (2011) who proves that dominant manipulation is impossible under common ignorance of others' preferences, for a variety of voting rules (their results were subsequently strengthened in Reijngoud and Endriss (2012) ). Proposition 11.2 is somewhat surprising: it says that whether a preference is dominant does not depend on what you know of other voters' preferences. It holds given common knowledge of the profile iff it holds given common ignorance (except one's own preference) of the profile. Dominant strategy as in Def. 3 seems too strong to be useful in voting theory, as it does not even rule out that everybody except you acts against their interests. In view of Proposition 11.6, an alternative designation for a (de re) known manipulation is strongly dominant manipulation.
Equilibrium and knowledge
Determining equilibria under incomplete knowledge comes down to decision taking under incomplete knowledge. Therefore we have to choose a decision criterion. Expected utility makes no sense here, because we didn't start with probabilities over profiles in the first place, nor with utilities. In the absence of prior probabilities, the following three criteria make sense. (i) The insufficient reason (or Laplace) criterion considers all possible states in a given situation as equiprobable. This criterion was used inÅgotnes and van Ditmarsch (2011) to determine equilibria of certain (Bayesian) games of imperfect information. (ii) The minimax regret criterion selects the decision minimizing the maximum utility loss, taken over all possible states, compared to the best decision, had the voter known the true state. (iii) The pessimistic (or Wald, or maximin) criterion compares decisions according to their worst possible consequences. The latter criterion, that we also call risk averse, is one that fits well our probability-free and utility-free model; this was also the criterion chosen in Conitzer et al. (2011); Meir (2015) . The only assumption here is that the probability distribution is positive in all states. We now fix this criterion for the rest of the paper. Pessimistic, optimistic, and other criteria only assuming positive probability are applied to social choice settings in Parikh et al. (2013) . Meir (2015) also considers the minimax-regret criterion.
In the presence of knowledge, and on the assumption that voters know their own preference (so that, in game theoretical terms, the payoff function is uniform throughout an agent's information set), the definition of an equilibrium extends naturally. For each agent, the combination of an agent i and an information set [s] ∼ i for that agent (for some state s in the knowledge profile) defines a so-called virtual agent: we model these imperfect information games as Bayesian games (Harsanyi, 1968) . Each virtual agent has the same set of strategies as the 'original' agent. An equilibrium is then a profile of strategies such that none of the virtual agents has an interest to deviate. An alternative way to present a Bayesian game, applied inÅgotnes and van Ditmarsch (2011), is to change the set of strategies instead of the set of agents. Instead of each agent in each information set (a 'virtual agent') choosing a strategy among the set of strategies, we have each agent choosing a conditional strategy among the larger set of conditional strategies, where conditions correspond to the information sets. We also follow that presentation for voting.
For risk-averse voters knowing their own preferences we can effectively determine if a conditional profile is an equilibrium without taking probability distributions into account, unlike in the more general setting of Bayesian games that it originates with.
For any C ′ ⊆ C, min i C ′ is the (unique) c ∈ C ′ such that c ′ i c for all c ′ ∈ C ′ . Let P be a set of profiles, ≻ ′ i ∈ O(C), and F a voting rule, then min i F (P) denotes
Given is a profile model M = (S, ∼, π), s ∈ S with π(s) = ≻, and voting rule F . The worst outcome for voter i in information set
. Definition 13 (Conditional preference, conditional profile, conditional equilibrium) Given is a profile model M = (S, ∼, π) and voting rule F . For each voter i, a conditional preference is a function [≻] i : S/∼ i → O(C) that assigns a preference to each information set for that voter. A conditional profile is a function from voters to conditional preferences. A conditional profile is a conditional equilibrium iff no agent has a pessimistic manipulation of any of its information sets. 2
In the situation without uncertainty, given n voters, a profile and a voting rule determine a winner. In the strategic game matrix, the outcome is the n-tuple of values (payoffs) of that winner for each voter, and to determine if it is an equilibrium we compare the value for any voter i with the value when i had voted differently: the value should not be higher. The outcome of a conditional profile is not an n-tuple of values, but an n-tuple of mtuples or vectors (x 1 i , . . . , x m i ), where voter i has m information sets and where x 1 i , . . . , x m i are expected outcomes. These vectors are unordered, so we have to compute equilibria differently. For example, given a voter 7 with two information sets x and y, we cannot say which of payoffs (0, 1) and (1, 0) she prefers. But we can say that virtual voter (7, x) prefers the second (wherein she gets 1) over the first (wherein she gets 0), and that virtual voter (7, y) prefers the first over the second. This merely is the Bayesian game calculation of equilibrium for virtual agents.
Proposition 14 States with the same profile can have different conditional equilibria.
More precisely: even if all voters have the same preferences, then when their knowledge about others' preferences is different, their manipulative behaviour may also be different.
The Appendix provides detailed examples that extend our running Example 7 about voting for movies. The reader may wish to verify in Figure 3 : that Sunil (2) has the same preference in state u as in state v, that voting for Cars (c) is not in a conditional equilibrium in u, whereas voting for Cars is in a conditional equilibrium in v.
Revealing voting preferences
We can extend the setting for the interaction of voting preferences and knowledge of the previous sections with operations wherein voters are informed of other's preferences, thus reducing ('updating') their uncertainty. An obvious choice for such updates is the public announcement (Plaza, 1989 ) of propositions about profiles. A public announcement can be modelled as an operation M s → (M|T ) s , where T ⊆ S is the denotation in M of a proposition about profiles ϕ, and M|T means model restriction to subdomain T . In that case we also write (M|ϕ) s . Given a knowledge profile M s , the precondition for execution of the operation public announcement of ϕ (or update with ϕ) is that ϕ is true in M s , and the way to execute it is to restrict the model M to all the states where ϕ is true. We can then investigate the truth of propositions about profiles in that model restriction. This allows us to evaluate propositions about profiles of shape 'after update with ϕ, ψ (is true),' such as: 'After voter 1 reveals her preference, voter 2 knows that he has a manipulation'.
All this is embodied in the following definition (see Section 7 for a formal version).
Definition 15 (Updated knowledge profile) Let M s be a knowledge profile, where M = (S, ∼, π), and let ϕ be a proposition about profiles with denotation S ′ ⊆ S and such that s ∈ S ′ . Then the updated knowledge profile (M|ϕ) s is defined as
A public announcement is considered information coming from an outside source (for example, a central authority) and that is reliable. However, It is common in dynamic epistemic logic to model a public announcement ϕ by an agent a (an inside source, so to speak, that is modelled in the system) as the public announcement of K a ϕ. This makes it possible to formalize that a voter reveals her preference to the other voters, as above. But given this identification, a voter revealing her preferences to me is indistinguishable in the logical analysis from someone else revealing to me that voter's preferences. Yet another situation is when a voter reveals her preferences only to another voter but not to all voters. This is not a public announcement but a private announcement. This is quite doable but requires a more complex analysis. Finally, announcements can be insincere, or lies. This also requires a more complex dynamic epistemic analysis.
We proceed with some results. Clearly, manipulations and equilibrium profiles are preserved after update, as these only depend on the profile of the actual state, that is preserved after any (truthful) update. These are not epistemic notions. For those, we have that:
Proposition 16 Knowledge of manipulation is preserved after update.
Proof The profiles of all states have a manipulation (Def. 8). This is a universal property that is preserved after update. This holds for de re as well as de dicto knowledge.
Proposition 17 Dominant manipulation is not preserved after update.
Proof This is an existential property that may not be preserved, namely if the (existential) strictness requirement is only satisfied in states that are removed in the update.
To investigate how conditional equilibria evolve after updates we first define the update of a conditional profile.
Definition 18 (Updated conditional profile) Let profile model M = (S, ∼, π) and conditional profile [≻] be given, where [≻] i : S\ ∼ i → O(C) are conditional preferences. Let ϕ be a proposition about profiles such that M|ϕ = (S ′ , ∼ ′ , π ′ ). Then the updated con-
A preference [≻] i : S\ ∼ i → O(C) may be affected in three different ways in an update:
• An information set for voter i disappears, namely if none of its states satisfies the update ϕ. The updated preference then has one less condition (the virtual voter (i, [s] ∼ i ) ceases to exist).
• An information set for voter i shrinks, because some states satisfy ϕ and others do not satisfy ϕ. We then have that [s] ∼ ′ i ⊂ [s] ∼ i . This may affect the value for i of preference ≻ i : states with minimal value may have been removed, namely if
). • An information set for i remains the same, because all of its states satisfy ϕ. The expected worst outcome for i remains the same.
Proposition 19 Conditional equilibrium is not preserved after update.
Proof An information update may affect an equilibrium as follows. The outcome for a virtual voter (i, [s] ∼ i ) casting vote ≻ i in the equilibrium is the worst outcome (winner) for voter i in information set [s] ∼ i . This payoff value of that winner is at least as good as the worst outcome in information set [s] ∼ i for any other preference ≻ ′′ i . This is fragile and not preserved after update. More precisely, we may have that (we recall that for all
where as before π ′ and ∼ ′ i are the valuation and accessibility relation in the updated profile model; and this requires a
Proposition 20 (Not being a conditional equilibrium) is not preserved after update.
Proof This requires a preference ≻ ′′ i for which
So conditional equilibria can both disappear and appear after updates (see also Example 21 below). It is unclear to us if there are general patterns here. However, additional strategic behaviour comes into the picture with these negative results. An update may consist of a voter revealing her voting preferences. It may be that this voter's sincere preference is not part of an equilibrium conditional profile, but that after this voter reveals her sincere preference, the updated conditional profile is an equilibrium. This interaction between strategic voting and strategic communication may be of interest.
Example 21 Consider the two-state profile model below (Figure 2 on page 20 in the Appendix contains the payoff matrix). In state t, after voter 1 informs voter 2 of her true preference a ≻ 1 c, no uncertainty remains, and 1 and 2 commonly know that the profile is ≻. From the Appendix we recall that equilibrium votes for ≻ are (a, b), (b, b), and that conditional equilibria for the t, u profile model have shape (xy, b) , where x is voter 1's preference in t and y is voter 1's preference in u, and where all but cc are equilibria.
We can now observe that all conditional equilibria are preserved after update. For example, given conditional profile (bc, b), the updated conditional profile according to Def. 15 is (b, b). There is therefore no strategic incentive for voter 1 to inform voter 2.
On the other hand, in state u voter 1 has an incentive to make her preferences known to 2. In the model with ≻ and ≻ ′ , there is no equilibrium wherein 2 votes c. But after 1 informs 2 that her preferences are the same as his preferences, (c, c) is an equilibrium. Most conditional equilibria of the two-state model are preserved, but not those where 1 votes c. For example, (ac, b) was an equilibrium, but the updated profile (c, b) is not an equilibrium.
Voter 1 has a strategic interest to reveal her preferences to voter 2 because subsequently she expects the outcome of the vote to be better. Before the update she expected b to win, after update she expects c to win, and c ≻ 1 b. This demonstrates that:
When there is uncertainty about votes, voters have different ways of acting strategically: voting strategically or strategically revealing voting preferences.
A logic of knowledge and voting
Given the set N of agents, the set of profiles O(C) N , that serve as propositional variables, and a voting rule F , we now define a logical language and semantics.
Definition 22 (Logical language) The language L is defined as
An element of the language is a formula, and ϕ is a formula variable; K i ϕ stands for 'voter i knows that ϕ'; [ϕ]ψ stands for 'after (public) announcement of ϕ, ψ (is true)'.
Definition 23 (Semantics) Let M s be a knowledge profile, where M = (S, ∼, π).The interpretation of formulas in a knowledge profile is defined as follows:
, and for all s ∈ S ′ , π ′ (s) = π(s). If M s |= ϕ for all s ∈ S, we write M |= ϕ (ϕ is valid on M) and if this is the case for all M, we say that ϕ is valid, and we write |= ϕ.
Note that profile models are standard Kripke models, but with valuations that satisfy special conditions. We now present principles that are valid on the class of profile models, and that will feature as axioms in the proof system. Let denote exclusive disjunction.
Axiom P spells out that only one profile is true in each state. Axiom N says that voters know their own preferences.
Proposition 24 The axioms Pand N are valid on the class of profile models.
Proof Axiom P is valid as the valuation π is a function from states to profiles. Axiom N formalizes the constraint on knowledge profiles that s ∼ i t implies π(s) i = π(t) i .
Proposition 25
The logic of knowledge and voting has a complete axiomatization over the class of profile models.
Proof The axiomatization of public announcement logic is standard (Plaza, 1989) . To this we add the axioms P and N. For the completeness we observe that the canonical model to determine the completeness of the logic without public announcements is a profile model (Prop. 24), and that the completeness of the logic with announcements is as usual (see van Ditmarsch et al. (2008) ) obtained because every formula is equivalent to one without announcements (the axioms are rewriting rules, pushing all logical connectives beyond announcements, such as [ϕ](ψ ∧ χ) ↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ)).
Example 26
We demonstrate the logic reusing Example 7 about Leela and Sunil.
• Leela prefers Alice over Cars: M t |= a ≻ 1 c • Sunil does not know that Leela prefers Alice over Cars: M t |= ¬K 2 (a ≻ 1 c)
• Leela knows Sunil's preference, but Leela is uncertain whether Sunil knows her preference:
• Sunil does not know that Leela prefers Alice over Cars, but after he was told so, he knows it:
We proceed to formalize the concepts involving knowledge and voting. The main definition of interest is that of conditional equilibrium. We start with some abbreviations. 3
Using these abbreviations (and trivial ones like a i b := ¬(b ≻ i a)), we now have that:
• Voter i has a manipulation of profile ≻:
• Voter i has a manipulation ≻ ′ i in profile ≻:
• Voter i with preference ≻ i knows de dicto that she has a manipulation:
• Voter i with preference ≻ i knows de re that she has a manipulation:
In the formalization of knowledge de re and de dicto, condition '≻ ′′ →' guarantees that only profiles ≻ ′′ in the information set π([t] ∼ i ) of a knowledge profile M t are selected.
The index set J in the definition of conditional equilibrium ranges over distinguishing formulas ϕ j(i) i for all (n) voters and for all information sets of those voters, i.e., J := {(j(1), . . . , j(n)) | 1 ≤ j(1) ≤ max(1), . . . , 1 ≤ j(n) ≤ max(n)} where each voter i has max(i) information sets; and where for condition ϕ j(i) i voter i has preference ≻ j(i) i . A distinguishing formula is only true in that information set of the voter and else false. As the domain is finite, such distinguishing formulas exist. The distinguishing formulas cover the profile model, i.e., let the information sets for a voter in a given profile model be numbered 1, . . . , max, then there are formulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ max such that j=1...max ϕ j and j=1...max (ϕ j → ¬ϕ j+1 ) (where max+1 = 1) are valid on the profile model. The formalization of conditional equilibrium then simply spells out the equilibrium for the Bayesian game with virtual agents ('virtual voters') (i, [s] ∼ i ) instead of voters i. Note that i∈N ≻ j(i) i represents a profile: a validity of the logic is that ≻ ↔ i∈N ≻ i .
Appendix: Examples of conditional equilibria in plurality voting
We recall Example 7 about Leela (1) and Sunil (2) voting, by plurality, for an animated movie that may be a (Alice), b (Brave), or c (Cars), where Leela's preference is a ≻ 1 b ≻ 1 c and Sunil's preference is c ≻ 2 b ≻ 2 a. We further assume that mother Devi, the central authority, has tie-breaking preference b ≻ tie a ≻ tie c. We present equilibria when there is: no uncertainty, uncertainty between two states with different profiles, and different kinds of uncertainty between three states (for two profiles).
No uncertainty We express the payoffs for both voters by their ranking (0, 1, or 2) for the winner. As this is majority voting, preference relations with the same most preferred candidate are indistinguishable. So, 'Leela votes a ≻ 1 b ≻ 1 c' and 'Leela votes a ≻ 1 c ≻ 1 b' can both be represented by 'Leela votes a'. (Given this identification, we call a a vote and not a preference (relation).) This simplifies the outcomes matrix and the payoff matrix. If 1 votes for her preference a and 2 votes for his preference c, then the tie-breaking preferences determines a as the winner, 2's least preferred candidate. A strategic vote of 2 for candidate b makes b win, a better outcome for voter 2. Equilibrium pairs of votes are (a, b) and (b, b). For voter 1, voting a is dominant. Figure 1 : Equilibria for ≻ and for ≻ ′ . From left to right: profile ≻, profile ≻ ′ , the matrix with winners, the outcome matrix for profile ≻, and the outcome matrix for profile ≻ ′ . Equilibria are boxed. We write i.j instead of (i, j) to denote the values for voters 1 and 2 of the outcome of the election.
The other profile used in the examples in this section is where 1 shares the preferences of 2. This is the profile ≻ ′ . Although (c, c) is an equilibrium vote for ≻ ′ , there are various suboptimal equilibria. There is no dominant vote. An overview of the equilibria for ≻ and for ≻ ′ is in Figure 1 .
Uncertainty between two profiles Now consider the profile model consisting of two states t with profile ≻ and u with profile ≻ ′ and that are the same for voter 2, but different for voter 1 (the accessibility relation for voter 1 is the identity on the model and for voter 2 it is the universal relation). Figure 2 depicts that profile model, the strategic game matrix with conditional preferences and winners, and the strategic game matrix with payoffs.
Conditional profiles are pairs (ij, k) where i is 1's vote in t and j is 1's vote in u, and k is 2's vote in {t, u}.
As voter 1 has two information sets, the conditional preference for 1 has two conditions, for each of which a choice between the three candidates (co-)determines the outcome of the majority vote. There are therefore 9 conditional preferences for voter 1. The matrix shows the conditional preferences for 1 by the candidate she votes for in t, followed by the candidate she votes for in u. Conditional preference xy for 1 means that in state t 1 votes x and in state u 1 votes y. The payoff matrix next to the winners matrix contains triples ij.k for, in this order: the value of the worst outcome for 1 given t (≻) of that conditional profile, the value of the outcome for 1 given u (≻ ′ ), and the value of the worst outcome for 2 given t, u, his only information set.
For example, for conditional profile (ba, c) we get ba as the entry in the winners matrix and (10.0) as the entry in the payoff matrix: if 1 votes b and 2 votes c then the tie (b ≻ tie a ≻ tie c) makes b win, value 1 for voter 1 and value 1 for voter 2 in ≻; if 1 votes a and 2 votes c then a wins, value 0 for voter 1 and for voter 2 in ≻ ′ ; the worst of 0 and 1 is 0, so the value for voter 2 of this conditional profile is 0. The equilibria are, maybe, as expected. (We only consider pure strategies.) If the profile is ≻ then it is still dominant for voter 1 to vote a (if the profile is ≻ ′ , voting for c is not dominant for voter 1). Because voter 2 is risk averse, (c, c) is no longer an equilibrium vote in ≻ ′ . As 2 is uncertain whether 1 prefers c over a or a over c, the safer (risk avoiding) strategy for 2 is now to vote b, even when 1 and 2 both prefer c. Voter 1 knows this as well.
Voter 2 does not have a dominant preference, because if he assumes that voter 1 always votes c, the best response is also to vote c and not to vote b. So this is the only case where voting b is not an equilibrium vote for 2.
Uncertainty between three states We now add further uncertainty to the two-state profile model where 2 is uncertain between profiles ≻ and ≻ ′ . Figure 3 displays two different ways to do this. In both depicted profile models voter 1 always knows voter 2's preferences. We will show that it is not rational for 2 to behave (vote) differently in s and in t, in the first, but that it is rational for 2 to behave differently in u and in v, in the second. Figure 3 also gives an overview of the conditional equilibria for both profile models, including the matrices with winners in order to calculate the payoffs. As it may be confusing to see three winners but four payoff values let us explain once more the mechanics of conditional profiles and conditional equilibria. For example, take the t, u, v model, with conditional profile (ac, bc) that is an equilibrium, where in the winners matrix we find bbc for that entry, and where in the payoff matrix we find 11.12. Conditional profile (ac, bc) is the conditional profile such that
• If 1 prefers a (i.e., in state t) then she votes a, and if 1 prefers c (i.e., in states u, v) then she votes c.
• If 2 is uncertain whether 1 prefers a (i.e., in states t, u) then he votes b, and if 2 knows that 1 prefers c (i.e., in state v) then he votes c.
The winners in states t, u, v of these conditional preferences are, respectively, b, b, c. If the state is t, then 1 votes a and 2 votes b, so b wins. If u, then 1 votes c and 2 votes b, so b wins. If v, then 1 votes c and 2 votes c, so c wins. The payoff entry is 11.12 because: for voter 1 in state t, the worst (and only) outcome is b with value 1, for voter 1 in states u, v the worst of b and c, with values 1 and 2, is (also) 1; for voter 2 in states t, u the worst of b and b, both with value 1, is 1, and for voter 2 the worst and only outcome in state v is c with value 2.
Conditional profile (ac, bc) is an equilibrium. For this, we have to check four virtual voters. For example, voter 1 in state t cannot do better, because the first digit of the payoff entries for profiles (bc, bc), (cc, bc) is not greater than 1; voter 1 in class {u, v} cannot do better: we check the second digit of the entries for conditional profiles (aa, bc) and (ab, bc). Voter 2 cannot do better in t, u, check the third digit in entries for (ac, ac) and (ac, cc); and voter 2 also cannot do better in v, in which case we check the fourth digit in the entries for (ac, ba) and (ac, bb). We are done.
In the s, t, u case, it does not make a difference to voter 2 whether he knows voter 1's preferences. If the profile is ≻, voter 1 knows that voting for a is dominant. On that assumption, voter 2 should vote b, such that b wins. Indeed, in almost all equilibria (except (bc, bc)), b wins and the payoff is 1 for both voters. Unlike for the two-state example, where in all equilibria voter 2 votes b, there are now equilibria wherein voter 2 does not vote b. However, these are not really interesting, as 1 votes b in these, which is dominated by 1 voting a.
On the other hand, in the t, u, v case, it makes a difference to voter 2 if 1 is uncertain or not. There are equilibria wherein both players vote c in state v, namely (ac, bc) and (bc, bc). Whereas there is no equilibrium wherein both players vote c in state u, even though that would have been just as much in their interest. We can easily justify this result by our intuitions. If voter 2 is uncertain about 1's preferences, the worst-case avoiding strategy remains voting b. If voter 2 knows that 1's preferences are his own, even 1's uncertainty is 1 2 not enough to make him change his vote. The same cannot be said for voter 1 in that state v, she has to weigh the odds against voter 2 playing safe and voting b instead; but either way, voting c then also gives her best result. So voter 1 should be indifferent between b and c when arguing from that worst-case scenario, and this is indeed the case: (ab, bc) and (bb, bc) are also equilibria.
